XCIM Network · ESP list onboarding

A new customer brings you a mailing list. What can you verify before the first send?

An email service provider (ESP) can ask for more than the sender’s word about opt-in. Here’s what one ESP account learned when it checked two contacts for one sender and one purpose.

One list, two results

On 10 November 2026, the ESP checked permission for Deploy to Agents to send pilot updates. The project operator controlled both the sender and ESP accounts.

Two contacts in the pilot CSV, at the time of the check
ContactWhat the issuer told the ESPIndependent public proof
Opted-in test contactEmabled reported active permission for this sender’s pilot updates.Unavailable. The ESP could not independently verify the match.
Test contact with no opt-in (control)The issuer found no evidence of matching permission.Not checked. The absence of a record is not a spam verdict.

Neither row established a public XCIM pass. These are historical observations, not permission to send today. The check informs list onboarding; it doesn’t replace other abuse controls or decide inbox placement.

Latest specification · draft-saez-xcim-04

Experimental individual Internet-Draft. A bounded C01/SR01 testnet pilot verified consent reuse and revocation on 26 October 2026; production readiness remains open.

Emabled provides the reference environment for sender registration, authenticated consent and ESP evaluation. A bounded C01/SR01 testnet pilot verified fresh consent, cached rechecks and incremental revocation on 26 October 2026. Production readiness remains open. The selected blockchain publication path uses Polygon through an RPC provider, without provisioning a node.

ENVIRONMENT: REFERENCE SANDBOXPROTOCOL: INTERNET-DRAFT -04 C01/SR01: BOUNDED PILOT VERIFIEDUPDATED: 2026-11-10

Earlier pilot evidence is preserved in the historical test-network report. It does not demonstrate operational C01/SR01 conformance.

Component state

Reference implementation and public network components · reviewed 2026-11-10; historical evidence retains its own dates
ComponentStateEvidence or next gate
C01/SR01 lifecycleBounded testnet pilot verifiedFour real observations, two anchors and production gates; same operator, pilot now closed
Issuer API and public keysOperational sandbox / keys publishedReadiness · Ed25519 key set
Company, consent and ESP workflowsManaged pilot verifiedMuMaps lifecycle and Deploy to Agents receipt/CSV evidence
Identity EvidenceOIDC supported; EVP vendor-origin experimentalDelivery-mode capabilities; Emabled-hosted EVP unavailable
Draft schemas and vectorsPublished draftVersioned schemas, vectors and Python/Node tools
Shared issuer registryNot publicIndependent authority, reviewed admission and signed lifecycle
Public event/state rootsHistorical test-network snapshotBatch 1 manifest and four proofs; earlier-profile behavior; not C01/SR01 evidence
Public anchorHistorical test-network anchorBlock 50191125 and verification report; not mainnet
Reference resolverNot releasedReviewed distribution and independent current-proof verification

What is live

Company configuration, OIDC identity and hosted consent, signed receipts, authenticated revocation, separate ESP workspaces with MFA, scoped authorizations, JSON/CSV jobs, CSV/ZIP console uploads and result exports are deployed. Lifecycle webhook infrastructure and an experimental EVP vendor-origin adapter are also deployed.

Historical earlier-profile verification milestone

Separate receiver and Python implementations checked the public earlier-profile snapshot. Active controls produced XCIM_PASS within its signed window; revoked and invalid evidence were rejected. These historical results do not demonstrate C01. A managed EMABLED_CONSENT_ACTIVE result alone still does not establish public verification. XCIM does not operate a production trust network.

Identity-evidence boundary

Address-control evidence is assessed when consent is granted. The corrected consent core verifies recipient-to-sender permission, accepted communication types, issuer authority, current state and blockchain evidence independently of any email. A future mail-server integration authenticates the sender separately.

Machine-readable status · Operator and continuity · Incident record · Contact