Deploy to Agents: receipt and ESP CSV pilot

A new site obtained a signed receipt after its backend key migration and an ESP evaluated a two-contact CSV.

Observed 6 and 10 November 2026. Operator-managed deployment using Emabled’s earlier-profile receipt wire 0.1 and OIDC-01, with Google as the tested identity provider. This report does not establish draft-04 C01/SR01 conformance, independent interoperability or public XCIM_PASS.

Participants and implementation

The Company workspace represents Deploy to Agents and the exact site xcim-pilot.deploytoagents.com. A separate ESP account used an application-scoped authorization. Both accounts were controlled by the project operator; separate accounts do not establish independently operated organizations. The tested application is distinct from MuMaps and from the site’s apex domain.

Implementation references: Emabled API/console release 0b84a37 and site backend revision 4cdb9e4. These identify the private implementation used for this operator report, not a public conformance suite. Observations were made through production-hosted HTTPS routes; that deployment location does not certify a production-ready XCIM trust network.

What was exercised

  1. New Company/site setup, 6 November: workspace setup, verified site domain, application registration, signed consent configuration, sender/presentation-domain authority and the bound HTTPS return. Developer/operator assistance was involved.
  2. Durable backend signing, 6 November: add a non-exportable Cloud KMS Ed25519 key to the same application, verify the earlier receipt using the new backend credential, move the pilot route and replace the backend process. The replacement signed with the same KMS key and verified the historical receipt again.
  3. New visitor decision, 10 November: a fresh invitation started a new session. The visitor authenticated, made a consent decision and returned to the site. The backend verified the issuer signature and application, manifest and session bindings; the visitor confirmed the verified-receipt screen.
  4. ESP authorization and CSV: renew the same provider’s access only for this application, marketing.pilot_updates and xcim-pilot.deploytoagents.com, with two rows per job and two rows total. Upload the CSV, open the completed job and inspect the downloaded results.
  5. Persistence and retirement: reload the ESP page and reopen the completed job. After the successful CSV test, stop the temporary original backend; the KMS-backed endpoint remained healthy.

Observed CSV results

The following case labels replace recipient identifiers. Evaluation occurred at ; the result validity ended at 14:02:40 UTC. These are historical observations, not current sending permission.

CaseClassificationIssuer resultPublic-proof result
Consented test contactactive_matchingEMABLED_CONSENT_ACTIVEunavailable / XCIM_STATUS_INDETERMINATE
Synthetic no-consent controlno_evidenceXCIM_NONEnot_checked

Conclusion: the managed issuer recognized the consented contact and did not infer consent for the control. Public proof was unavailable for the matching row. No blockchain proof, inclusion/finality check or public XCIM pass was established by this CSV run.

Consent-screen publication is a separate workflow

A draft with edited consent text was saved, but no verified publication-signing endpoint was configured. No editor version was published. The console was checked to explain the prerequisite, open the correct site’s endpoint configuration and return to the saved draft. This pilot continued using the previously signed consent configuration. Durable backend authentication in KMS does not by itself enable automatic publication of changed consent text.

Validity and operational limits

The renewed ESP authorization ended on 10 November 2026 at 15:53 UTC and its two-row budget was consumed. The site’s domain-role authorization expires on 13 November 2026 at 16:15:28 UTC; the registry credential for the KMS-backed application key expires on 6 November 2027 at 17:09:28 UTC. These are independent limits. A durable key does not make domain authority or ESP access perpetual. Future visits and evaluations require current configuration and authorization.

What this report does not establish

Evidence and privacy

The operator inspected the verified-receipt page, the Company/ESP scopes, the completed job after a reload, the downloaded two-row CSV and the backend’s restart/signing checks. The raw records are retained privately. Download the sanitized observation summary: it is an operator report, not a cryptographic proof bundle that an independent receiver can use to establish a pass. Recipient addresses, account identifiers, receipt/job identifiers, tokens and private keys are omitted.

Follow the Company guide · Follow the ESP guide · Current implementation status and remaining gates

Latest specification · draft-saez-xcim-04

Experimental individual Internet-Draft. A bounded C01/SR01 testnet pilot verified consent reuse and revocation on 26 October 2026; production readiness remains open.